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Russia’s strategy towards Moldova: continuation or change?
Witold Rodkiewicz
The nomination on 21 March of deputy prime minister Dmitri Rogozin to 
the newly created post of the Russian president’s special representative 
for Transnistria and to the post of co-chairman of the Russian-Moldovan 
intergovernmental committee demonstrates the Kremlin’s increased inter-
est in Moldova, and may be a sign of a change in Russia’s strategy towards 
this country. Other developments which may suggest a revival of Rus-
sia’s policy towards Moldova include the appointment on 5 April of Farit 
Mukhametshin as Russia’s new ambassador in Chisinau. Mukhametshin 
is a high-ranking official who had previously headed the Federal Agency 
for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad 
and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo), which 
is one of the major instruments of Russia’s ‘soft power’ policy towards the 
post-Soviet states. The Kremlin’s growing interest in Moldova has further 
been confirmed by an unprecedented visit by Russia’s defence minister 
Anatoly Serdyukov to Transnistria on 12 April, and a two-day visit by Dmitri 
Rogozin to Chisinau and Tiraspol on 16–17 April.
So far, the major aim of Moscow’s policy towards Moldova was to permanently include this 
country into Russia’s zone of influence. This was to be achieved by promoting a solution to 
the Transnistrian conflict that would guarantee the pro-Russian Transnistria a right to veto in 
matters of key significance concerning the united country and legitimise a Russian military 
presence in the separatist region. The nomination of Rogozin, who in the past has repeatedly 
argued that Russia should recognise Transnistria’s independence, should mainly be seen 
as a form of pressure on Chisinau and its Western partners, to convince them to accept 
a solution to the conflict on Russian conditions. Should this pressure prove ineffective, 
the Kremlin most probably would not rule out an alternative scenario – to recognise 
Tiraspol’s independence and contribute to the country’s permanent split. In the upcoming 
months, however, Moscow will try to achieve a ‘Taiwanisation’ of Transnistria, that is, pro-
vide the region – which from the point of view of international law is a part of Moldova – with 
the opportunity to develop trade relations independently of Chisinau. This is probably why 
Russia agreed last autumn to resume negotiations in the 5+2 format (Moldova and Transn-
istria as the two sides of the conflict, with Russia, Ukraine and OSCE as intermediaries, 
the US and the EU as observers). At the same time, Russia will strive to tighten the institu-
tional and economic links between Transnistria and the Russian Federation. 
In its policy towards Moldova, Moscow wants to use the current favourable international 
situation, including the EU’s focus on its internal crisis, a decline in American interest in the 
situation in Eastern Europe, and the growing willingness on the part of Germany to solve 
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the region’s problems, as a significant precondition for deepening the relations between the 
EU& Berlin and Russia. 
Moldova in Russia’s foreign policy
The aims of Russia’s policy towards Moldova relate to two main areas which, according to 
the Russian elites, are of key importance for Russia’s international position: to establish 
the basis for the country’s relations with the West in the field of security, and to perma-
nently include Eastern Europe’s post-Soviet states into the Russian zone of influence, which 
at the same time would mean winning the geopolitical rivalry with the European Union in the 
region. In pursuing these goals, Russia is attempting to achieve two things:
1. Maintain its military presence in Moldova to guarantee that the country remains out-
side NATO. Moscow is thus also trying to establish the informal principle that it is entitled 
to unilaterally decide about its military presence in post-Soviet states. The instalation in 
Romania of elements of the American anti-missile shield has made Russia yet more interested 
in maintaining its military presence in Transnistria, as this creates a possibility for installing 
its own military systems there in ‘response’ to the U.S. missiles in Romania.
2. Prevent Moldova’s integration with the EU. Russia is trying to change the direction 
of Moldova’s integration strategy from EU-oriented to Eurasian, and thereby to prevent 
the implementation of the Association 
Agreement currently being negotiated 
between Moldova and the EU. Russia is 
also attempting to block Chisinau’s plans 
to implement the Third Energy Package. 
Moscow is trying to convince the Moldo-
van elites to join the Common Economic 
Space1. The successful realisation of these 
aims would demonstrate to Brussels and the post-Soviet states that any attempts to imple-
ment integration projects in the CIS area without Moscow’s consent are doomed to fail.
3. Solve the Transnistrian problem according to the formula contained in the so-called 
Kozak Memorandum of 2003, whose main idea was the ‘asymmetric federalisation’ 
of Moldova, aimed at maximising Transnistria’s impact on the policy of the federal authorities 
and minimising the influence of the federal authorities in Transnistria, while simultaneously 
ensuring the continued presence of the Russian troops as the gurantors of the conflict’s set-
tlement. Such a solution would shift the political balance in the Moldovan state in favour 
of the pro-Russian forces.
Russia’s strategy towards Moldova to date
So far Russia’s strategy towards Moldova has been based on combination of three elements: 
attempting to change Chisinau’s policy from pro-European to pro-Russian; limiting Tiraspol’s 
autonomy from Moscow; and resuming the negotiations in the so-called 5+2 format.
Russia was probably counting on such a shift in Moldova’s policy taking place as a result 
of expected reconfiguration of the ruling Alliance for European Integration (AIE), in which 
its most pro-Romanian wing would be replaced with pro-Russian groupings, while its prag-
matic centre would be persuaded to abandon the pro-European orientation in favour of 
a pro-Russian one. After the Moldovan parliamentary elections in November 2010, 
1 An economic integration struc-
ture launched in July 2010 
grouping Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, originally 
as a customs union, 
and since 1 January 2012 
as the Common Economic 
Space, to be replaced 
in the future by a Eurasian 
Economic Community.
Rogozin’s nomination should 
mainly be seen as a way of putting 
pressure on Chisinau and its Western 
partners to accept the conflict 
solution on Russian terms.
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the head of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergey Naryshkin paid a visit to Chis-
inau to persuade the leader of the Democratic Party Marian Lupu to leave the AIE and form 
a coalition with the Party of Communists (PCRM). A similar goal seems to have been pur-
sued by Igor Dodon, the major PCMR politician of the younger generation and a former dep-
uty prime minister, who had left the Party of Communists together with two other deputies 
in autumn 2011, and tried to convince the AIE to jointly support the candidature of Zinaida 
Greceanu2 to the post of president. Her victory would have meant a de facto reconfiguration 
of the ruling political system at that time. The trick did not work, however, and in the end all 
three deputies from the so-called Dodon group, fearing early elections, helped to elect the 
AIE’s candidate Nicolae Timofti as the new president. In this context, it seems that Rogozin’s 
nomination was probably a reaction to the stabilisation of the pro-European government in 
Moldova. The election of the new president (on 16 March) eliminated the threat of early 
elections which, according to the latest available public opinion polls, would be won by the 
Party of Communists3.
Russia has used economic tools to try to convince the ‘pragmatic’ wing of the AIE 
(the Democratic Party, headed by the speaker of the parliament Marian Lupu, and the Liberal- 
-Democratic Party, headed by Prime Minister Vladimir Filat) of the benefits of a possible 
change of orientation from pro-European to pro-Russian. In the last couple of years Mos-
cow created favourable conditions to stimulate the growth of Moldovan exports to Russia. 
As a result, Russia’s share of Moldovan export rose from 22% in 2009 to 28% in 2011; 
in the same period, the EU’s share fell from 52% to 49%. Russia expanded the possibilities 
for wine and agricultural produce imports from Moldova. At the same time, those imports 
remained subject to the ‘manual supervision’ regime carried out by the consumer protec-
tion service (Rospotrebnadzor) and the 
veterinary and phytosanitary surveillance 
service (Rosselkhoznadzor); these bodies 
are in able to modify the list of companies 
which are granted the ‘privilege’ of export-
ing their produce to Russia. Temporary 
limits on the import of certain goods are meant as warnings addressed to Moldovan politi-
cians that access to the Russian market can be denied any time, as was sometimes the case 
in the past. Some Moldovan politicians are also active in business, and can be particularly 
vulnerable to such pressure from Russia. 
By highlighting the opportunities provided by access to the Russian market, Moscow has 
tempted Moldova’s elites with economic advantages (including a 30% reduction in the price 
of gas) in exchange for abandoning the European integration plans and joining the Common 
Economic Space. Russian diplomats and pro-Russian Moldovan experts hint that the crea-
tion of a deep and comprehensive free trade area with the EU may result in limits on the 
export of Moldovan goods to Russian markets4. They also suggest that Moldova refusal to 
sign the EurAsEc Customs Union may have negative consequences for the approximately 
300,000 Moldovan guest workers in Russia, who each year send back to Moldova remit-
tances worth about 7–8% of the country’s GDP5.
To pressure Chisinau Moscow is also taking advantage of Moldova’s total dependence on 
imports of Russian gas. Despite the attempts Moldova has made since mid-2011, it has 
failed to finalize negotiations with Gazprom on a new long-term contract (the old one expired 
at the end of last year)6. Russia wants Chisinau to give up the Third Energy Package which 
Moldova is legally bound to implement as a member of the Energy Community.
To convince Moldova’s elites and society to change the direction of its integration drivea, 
Russia is also using soft power tools. The most significant is Russian television which is the 
main source of information for a significant part of Moldovan society7. It popularises the view 
 
 
2 Zinaida Greceanu, considered 
a pro-Russian politician, was 
Moldova’s prime minister dur-
ing the presidency of Vladimir 
Voronin, and the PCRM’s 
presidential candidate.
 
 
3 According to a poll conducted 
in January by the Moldovan 
Association of Sociologists and 
Demographers, 47.5% of the 
respondents said they would 
vote for the Communists, and 
46.9% for the three parties of 
the governing coalition.
4 Such a warning was expressed 
on 17 March by President 
Dmitri Medvedev at a Eurasian 
Economic Community summit, 
attended by Moldova’s acting 
president Marian Lupu 
as an observer.
5 According to the World Bank 
in 2010, one-third (US$ 440 
million) of the total sum of 
US$ 1.3 billion transferred to 
Moldova by Moldovan guest 
workers was sent from Russia.
6 Gazprom has agreed to tempo-
rarily extend the contract 
until June.
7 For 25% of Moldovans 
Russian television is the 
primary source of information, 
for 22% the secondary source, 
while the corresponding 
figures for Moldovan 
television are 24% and 
16% respectively. Data com-
piled by Institutul de Opinii 
Publice, Barometrul Opiniei 
Publice. Republica Moldova 
Noiembrie 2011, p. 27.
Russia is attempting to change 
the orientation of Moldova’s integration 
from European to Eurasian.
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that the prospects for the country’s integration with the EU are an illusion, and real benefits 
can be drawn only from Eurasian integration. Similar views are propagated in Moldova by 
Russian-language newspapers owned by both Russian (Komsomolskaya Pravda v Moldove, 
and the Moldovan edition of Kommersant) and local publishers (Moldavskie Vedomosti, 
Panorama), as well as by some of the experts collaborating with the Russian-funded Priz-
nanie Foundation, the opinion-forming Internet portal ava.md and the RIA Novosti Moldova 
press agency.
An important role in influencing the views of a significant part of Moldova’s society in fa-
vour of Russia is also played by the Russian Orthodox Church, of which the Metropolis 
of Chisinau and all Moldova is a part. The Church promotes the idea of the so-called ‘Rus-
sian world’, i.e. a community of all Orthodox Christians in the post-Soviet area based on the 
common civilisation and culture. 
Russia’s policy towards Transnistria
In 2011 Kremlin’s strove to remove Igor Smirnov and his team from power in Transnistria. 
Smirnov has headed the separatist region since 1991 and even though Transnistria was 
economically and militarily dependent on Russia, Smirnov had managed to achieve a degree 
of autonomy vis-à-vis the Kremlin. While his rule ensured that Tiraspol would follow a pro-
Russian orientation, there were two reasons why Kremlin ceased to consider him as a con-
venient figure. Firstly, by his refusal to negotiate with Moldova he became an obstacle to the 
implementation of a Russian vision for settling the conflict. Secondly, he proved unable to 
solve Transnistria’s economic problems, and that increased for Russia the cost of subsidizing 
the region. This is why Moscow insisted 
that the December 2011 presidential elec-
tions in Transnistria should not be rigged 
in favour of Smirnov, as it was counting on 
the victory of the speaker of the parliament 
Anatoly Kaminsky, whom it supported. 
To put pressure on Smirnov and discredit 
him, Russian officials accused his family 
of corruption, and Russian television (widely watched in Transnistria) critisized him repeat-
edly. Even though Moscow failed to ensure the election its favourite candidate, its attacks 
on Smirnov facilitated the victory of the deputy and former speaker of the local parliament 
Yevgeny Shevchuk. The new leader turned out to be fully acceptable to the Kremlin, as he 
is ready to negotiate with Chisinau, while at the same time is reliably pro-Russian. The new 
Transnistrian leader has o shown enthusiastic support for the Eurasian Union project, and 
suggests that the conflict between Transnistria and Moldova could be solved by accession of 
both to the Russian-led Common Economic Space. Shevchuk’s position vis-à-vis the Kremlin 
is weaker than Smirnov’s, which opens for Russia a possibility to exploit the divisions within 
the Transnistrian ruling establishment in order to maximize its influence. Moreover, facing 
a 70% budget deficit and a lack of hard currency reserves, the new ‘president’ is in no posi-
tion to bargain with the Kremlin. In January this year representatives of the Russian Federa-
tion’s customs service and the Central Bank of Russia paid visits to Transnistria to inspect 
their local analogues. Transnistria also hosted Valery Golubev, the deputy CEO of Gazprom, 
who came to start talks on Transnistria’s gas debt (which stands at around US$2.5 billion). 
On 16 March Russia decided to grant to Transnistria a US$150 million subsidy, thereby 
demonstrationg its support for the new president and its readiness to bear the costs of sup-
porting the Transnistrian para-state8. 
8 S. Gamova, ‘Moskva vosstan-
avlivayet opeku nad Prid-
nestrovyem’, Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta,19.03.2012.
Russia’s primary goal in the 5+2 
negotiations is the ‘Taiwanisation’ 
of Transnistria, i.e. enabling 
the region to legally engage 
in international economic activity.
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Furthermore, as announced by Dmitri Rogozin during his visit to Tiraspol on 16–17 April, 
Russia will strengthen institutional links with Transnistria by opening the office of the Rus-
sian president’s special representative for Transnistria and establishing joint boards with 
Transnistrian economic ministries. 
Resumption of the 5+2 negotiations
In 2011 Russia succeeded in unblocking the so-called 5+2 negotiations concerning the 
possible solution of the conflict in Transnistria. After a five-year break, in November 2011 
the first round of talks took place, followed by another on 28–29 February 2012. However, 
the participants failed to settle their dispute on the negotiation principles. The bone of con-
tention is the ‘equal status’ rule which Tiraspol, supported by Russia, is trying to interpret 
very broadly in order to achieve a status equal to Chisinau’s. Chisinau, for its part, fears that 
any concession on this seemingly minor formal issue would be used by Russia and Transnis-
tria to push through a federal model as a basis for the final resolution of the conflict. 
It seems that Russia’s primary goal in the 5+2 negotiations is the ‘Taiwanisation’ of Transn-
istria – that is, providing the region with the possibility to legally engage in international eco-
nomic cooperation9. This would strengthen Tiraspol’s position towards Moldova, albeit with 
no full sovereignty for the region. Moreover, it would offer better prospects for improving the 
condition of the Transnistrian economy, and thereby easing Russia’s burden of supporting 
the region (to the tune of around US$20–30 million per year, plus de facto free gas sup-
plies). This is also the underlying goal of the ‘small steps’ strategy announced by Tiraspol, 
focused on postponing the question of the region’s status and concentrating on unblocking 
its economic relations with Moldova. Currently, Tiraspol’s main aim is to negotiate a package 
of customs regulations which would enable Transnistrian companies to export their goods 
without any formal control on the part of the Moldovan authorities. This would generate 
direct economic benefits, but at the same time create an additional obstacle to Moldova 
signing the DCFTA.
At the same time, Russia and Tiraspol are consistently refusing to participate in the talks 
on changing the format of the peacekeeping operation in Transnistria, which is dominat-
ed by Russian troops. This has become 
particularly evident since the incident on 
1 January, when a Russian officer shot 
and killed a Moldovan citizen in the so-
called security zone. Following the inci-
dent, Chisinau repeated its proposal to 
transform the Russian military peacekeep-
ing operation into an international civil operation. This was the first time that the proposal 
had won the support of Kyiv and Berlin. However, Moscow and Tiraspol refused to engage 
in any talks on this issue. 
The attempts at ‘Taiwanisation’ do not necessarily mean that Moscow has given up the plans 
of using the region to ‘tie’ Moldova to the Russian zone of influence. This is evidenced by 
Moscow’s diplomatic pressure on Chisinau last year concerning the lifting of the 2005 law 
which excludes federalisation as a model for regulating Moldova’s relations with Transnistria. 
In this context, the nomination of Dmitri Rogozin increases the pressure on Chisinau (and its 
Western partners) by hinting at a possibility of the ‘Caucasian’ solution of the Transnistrian 
conflict, i.e. a formal recognition of the separatist republic’s independence. This is further 
confirmed by the fact that similar posts have been created for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 It is worth noting in this 
context that Russia’s special 
representative for the conflict’s 
settlement, Sergey Gubarev, 
used to work as the Russian 
Federation’s diplomatic repre-
sentative in Taiwan.
The attempted ‘Taiwanisation’ does 
not mean that Moscow has abandoned 
the plan of using the region to ‘tie’ Mol-
dova to the Russian zone of influence.
I S S U E  7 4  |  1 9 . 0 4 . 2 0 1 2  |  C E N T R E  F O R  E A S T E R N  S T U D I E S
COMMENTARYOSW
6OSW.WAW.PL
© Copyright by OSW
Editors: Adam Eberhardt, 
Anna Łabuszewska, 
Katarzyna Kazimierska
Translation: Magdalena Klimowicz 
Cooperation: Jim Todd
DTP: Wojciech Mańkowski
The Centre for Eastern Studies (CES) was established in 1990. CES is financed from the budget. 
The Centre monitors and analyses the political, economic and social situation in Russia, Central 
and Eastern European countries, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Central Asia. 
CES focuses on the key political, economic and security issues, such as internal situations 
and stability of the mentioned countries, the systems of power, relations between political 
centres, foreign policies, issues related to NATO and EU enlargement, energy supply security, 
existing and potential conflicts, among other issues. 
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities. 
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6A, 
00-564 Warsaw
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl 
Conclusions
1. Russia is implementing an extensive and multifaceted policy towards Moldova, aiming 
at a permanent change in the country’s geopolitical orientation from a pro-European to 
a pro-Russian direction. The recent revival of Russia’s activity towards Chisinau and Tiraspol 
is a part of the general revival of Moscow’s policy towards the CIS. We should expect this 
to be one of the priorities of Vladimir Putin’s third presidency. Russia expects that success 
in Moldova would be a sign to other post-Soviet states that the Kremlin would not accept 
any other choice than pro-Russian orientation on their part.
2. Chisinau’s pro-European orientation is the subject of an intensive political fight, encour-
aged by Moscow, between the Alliance for European Integration on one side and the Com-
munists and socialists on the other. Russia seems to back those political forces which 
favour new elections, as they know that the most probable winner would be the pro-Russian 
Communist party. While not giving up (despite the election of a new president) attempts to 
foster changes on Moldovan political scene, Russia will use economic tools to put presure 
on the current government.
3. Russia will use the 5+2 negotiations to convince Chisinau to gradually eliminate those ob-
stacles hindering Transnistria’s economic activity which are due to the region’s lack of formal 
international recognition. Moreover, Mos-
cow will continue to press Chisinau to can-
cel the law blocking the possible federali-
sation of the Moldovan state. At the same 
time, Russia will try to avoid any conces-
sions in the matters related to Transnis-
tria’s formal status or the Russian military 
presence in the region. There is a risk that 
in the context of a lack of clear position on 
the part of its Western partners, Chisinau, 
exposed to Russian pressure, will gradu-
ally accept the solution proposed by Rus-
sia, whose implementation (particularly 
concerning customs-related issues and the principles underlying the economic relations be-
tween Moldova and Transnistria) may hinder or even block the establishment of a deep and 
comprehensive free trade area between Moldova and the EU.
4. The ‘Caucasian’ model of conflict-solution will be used by the Kremlin as a means of put-
ting pressure on Chisinau to accept the federal model for Moldova. Should Chisinau resist, 
however, it is to be expected that the Kremlin will abandon the idea of using the reintegration 
of the two parts of Moldova as a tool for drawing the country into its zone of influence, and will 
opt for a ‘legal divorce’, i.e. achieving some form of international recognition for Transnistria.
Witold Rodkiewicz, co-operation Wojciech Konończuk 
There is a risk that in the context 
of a lack of clear position on 
the part of its Western partners, 
Chisinau, exposed to Russian 
pressure, will gradually accept 
the solution proposed by Russia, 
whose implementation may hinder 
or even block the establishment of 
a deep and comprehensive free trade 
area between Moldova and the EU.
